The Soviet government has been run by Marxian revolutionists for thirty years; what has to be explained by a planner of American foreign policy is why in 1945 the Soviet government expanded its frontiers and its orbit, and what was the plan and pattern of its expansion.
The Soviet government has been run by Marxian revolutionists for thirty years; what has to be explained by a planner of American foreign policy is why in 1945 the Soviet government expanded its frontiers and its orbit, and what was the plan and pattern of its expansion.That can be done only by remembering that the Soviet government is a Russian government and that this Russian government has emerged victorious over Germany and Japan.Tags: Primary Homework Help TudorsEssay Urging RatificationMilitary Child EssayBest Resume Writing ServicesWatching Tv Is Good Or Bad EssayCreative Writing Research
The total area acquired by Russia between 19 is approximately as large as the total area lost between 19.
Russia has redeemed the hostages she gave to defeat, revolution and national self-determination." "The western frontiers of the Soviet Sphere of Influence coincide so closely with those Czarist Russia planned to draw after the defeat of the Central Powers that Czarist and Soviet policies appear to differ as regards methods only.
Having omitted from his analysis the fact that we are dealing with a victorious Russiahaving become exclusively preoccupied with the Marxian ideology, and with the communist revolutionit is no wonder that the outcome of Mr. That is why his conclusions about how we should deal with the Soviets have no pattern, and are also amorphous. X, it may be useful to call in another expert, a distinguished political geographer, Professor Robert Strausz-Hupe of the University of Pennsylvania, whose article on "The Western Frontiers of Russia" appeared in the July issue of The Review of Politics, quarterly published by the University of Notre Dame: "The mosaic of treaties and agreements, which forms the legal basis of Russian territorial acquisitions, is composed of strangely assorted pieces.
X's analysis is nothing more definite, concrete and practical than that the Soviets will encroach and expand "at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points." Mr. Its general, although somewhat crude, shape was first revealed by the Soviet-German Secret Protocol of August 23, 1939. The latter transaction was consummated in the Soviet-Rumanian Agreement of June 28, 1940.
From inter-Allied agreements concluded during World War I and the published statements of leading public figures, notably Russian and Czech, emerges the Czarist Government's Grand Design for eastern Europe: the frontier of Russian Poland was to have been pushed westward towards Stettin, bringing within the Russian Empire the Polish provinces of Germany and Austria; the north-eastern provinces of Hungary were to be ceded to Russia and a Greater Serbia and Greater Rumania were to receive additional territories carved from Hungary, leaving the latter country a small state wedged between Serbia (Yugoslavia), Rumania and a Kingdom of the Czechs ruled by a Russian Prince; and Russia was to receive the European possessions of Turkey inclusive of the Straits.
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The aggregate of annexed territories, protectorates, alliances and Pan-Slav affiliations would have extended Russian influence to the Oder River, the Alps, the Adriatic and the Aegean.
They are alienated above all by the prospect of war, which could break out by design or accident, by miscalculation or provocation, if at any of these constantly shifting geographical and political points the Russians or Americans became so deeply engaged that no retreat or compromise was possible. We may now ask why the official diagnosis of Soviet conduct, as disclosed by Mr.
X's article, has led to such an unworkable policy for dealing with Russia. X has neglected even to mention the fact that the Soviet Union is the successor of the Russian Empire and that Stalin is not only the heir of Marx and of Lenin but of Peter the Great, and the Czars of all the Russias. X decided not to consider the men in the Kremlin as the rulers of the Russian State and Empire, and has limited his analysis to the interaction of "two forces": "the ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin" and the "circumstances of the power which they have now exercised for nearly three decades in Russia." Thus he dwells on the indubitable fact that they believe in the Marxian ideology and that "they have continued to be predominantly absorbed with the struggle to secure and make absolute the power which they seized in November 1917." But with these two observations alone he cannot, and does not, explain the conduct of the Soviet government in this postwar erathat is to say its aims and claims to territory and to the sphere of influence which it dominates.
It restores Russia to the geographical positions held by the last Romanovs.
The Baltic Republics and Bessarabia revertedas, writing nearly twenty years ago, Isaiah Bowman predictedto Russian domination; the territorial clauses of the Peace Treaty with Finland, outright cession of the Karelian Isthmus and Petsamo Province, and lease of a naval base at Porkkla-Udd, reinstate Russia actually, although not formally, in her pre-1917 positions on the Baltic and Arctic coasts; and Russian magnanimity towards Poland is rewarded by valuable gains in East Prussia, Bukovina and the Carpathians.